Citizens Budget Commission
Report on the New York City Department of Correction
by Dean Michael Mead
- Foreword
Executive Summary
Introduction- Trends in Resources
- Departmental Performance in the 1990s
- Volume
Efficiency
Quality
- Conclusions and Discussion
FOREWORD
Founded in 1932, the Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civic organization devoted to influencing constructive change in the finances and services of New York State and New York City government. This report was prepared under the auspices of the CBC’s Municipal Services Committee, which I chair. The other members of the Committee are Harold I. Berliner, Alan M. Berman, Jeremiah Blitzer, Mark Brossman, Daniel J. Gross, Peter C. Hein, Jerome E. Hyman, Thomas N. Keltner, William F. McCarthy, Frank J. McLoughlin, Frances Milberg, John R. Miller, Philip L. Milstein, Steven M. Polan, Adam R. Rose, Edward L. Sadowsky, Lee S. Saltzman, Barbara Z. Shattuck, Ronald G. Weiner, Eileen S. Winterble, and Lawrence B. Buttenwieser, ex-officio.
The Municipal Services Committee was created in the wake of the 1970s fiscal crisis to monitor and report on the manner in which City agencies used scarce public resources to produce services. Its earliest products were "Service Scorecards," brief reviews of agency performance based on indicators of volume, quality and efficiency. Between 1981 and 1985, 24 scorecards appeared in The CBC Quarterly, examining eight public services—police, fire, correction, sanitation, mass transit, education, health care, and social services. The first of five annual omnibus reports covering the agencies simultaneously was released in February 1982.
Later in the 1980s, the Committee’s reports became more specialized, focusing on smaller groups of agencies (like the uniformed services), and later on individual agencies. These reports examined selected agencies in greater depth and recommended actions to improve performance. In January 1993 separate reports on the police, fire, sanitation and correction departments were issued, making recommendations that would save at least $450 million. One year later, a report on the Human Resources Administration was presented to the new administration of Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, recommending actions that would improve significantly the quality of services while reducing costs by as much as $670 million.
In the fall of 1996 CBC staff began research for a new services report. This report was intended to assess how municipal agencies fared during an extended period of fiscal retrenchment, fiscal years 1990-1996. It was decided that in order to cover a broad range of agencies, this report would be presented without making new recommendations, as had been the recent and preferred pattern. Progress on that report was stalled, however, because of difficulties obtaining necessary information from City agencies.
As a result, the Committee shifted its plans from publishing a comprehensive multi-agency report to focusing on individual agencies where enough information is publicly available to allow a credible analysis of performance. It was the judgment of the Committee and staff that such a report could be written about the Department of Correction.
At the time of this report’s publication, City officials and CBC staff are conducting a series of meetings to facilitate the transfer of data on other agencies. We are hopeful that this process will permit the CBC to produce meaningful and informative reports on the remaining agencies.
This report was written by Dean Michael Mead, Assistant Director of Research. Research support was provided by Matthew Lesieur, Research Assistant. The report was prepared for publication by Nicolette Macdonald, Publications Coordinator.
Bud H. Gibbs
June 20, 1997
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The New York City Department of Correction (DOC) spends $1.2 billion a year to incarcerate and care for an average of over 18,000 inmates a day. This population includes persons convicted of a crime and sentenced to one year or less, and parole violators and persons sentenced to more than one year awaiting transfer to the New York State prison system, but it is predominantly suspected criminals detained while waiting for trial either because they were refused bail or could not afford it.
This report reviews the DOC’s performance between fiscal years 1990 and 1996 based on three criteria—volume, efficiency and quality. The analysis finds the volume of inmates fluctuated during the period, but is down overall. The DOC improved the quality of living conditions in the jails, but some services to inmates worsened. The overall efficiency of the DOC declined slightly, despite some significant productivity improvements, because of increased staffing ratios and the increased cost of employee fringe benefits and of repaying debt issued to build new jails.
Volume
The jails population grew between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, declined through 1994, and then rose again in response to increased arrest activity by the police. The average daily population in the jails was almost 7 percent smaller in fiscal year 1996 than in fiscal year 1990, despite a slight increase in the number of persons admitted to the jails.
The explanation for this seeming disparity is that, although more inmates were admitted to the jails, on average they stayed for shorter periods. There are three likely causes of the shortening of average length of stay. First, the DOC did a better job of transferring State prisoners in a timely fashion: The State prisoner population in the jails declined close to one-quarter after it peaked in 1992. Second, arrests for misdemeanors and less serious offenses, such as "quality of life" crimes, increased in recent years; people arrested for these infractions spend less time in jail. Finally, efforts in Brooklyn to speed the adjudication of detainees successfully cut the time between arrest and trial.
Efficiency
Between fiscal years 1990 and 1996 the annual constant-dollar cost per inmate rose 2 percent to $63,725. The most significant cause of this growth was debt service spending, which increased 130 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Fringe benefits, such as employee health insurance, were one-fifth more expensive in constant dollars. Growth in these two areas negated some important improvements in efficiency, such as a 46 percent reduction in overtime spending, an increase in the ratio of supervisors to correction officers, the successful introduction of information technology into population management, and three productivity initiatives that reduced uniformed staffing needs by 870 positions. On the down side, paid absence rates rose substantially for DOC employees, and the ratio of correction officers to inmates increased 10 percent.
See "New York City Department of Correction Summary of Performance, Fiscal Years 1990-1996."
Quality
The DOC’s performance on indicators of quality was dichotomous. On the one hand, the quality of inmate living conditions improved. The jails were safer after a 70 percent reduction in inmate-on-inmate violence and a 27 percent decrease in use of force by correction officers. The jails were also less crowded: The combination of a smaller population and additional jail space brought the ratio of population to capacity to its lowest level since the 1970s, allowing the DOC to abandon lower quality housing facilities such as jail barges, upstate jails and temporary shelters. The DOC also added new medical facilities, and medical visits increased. The percentage of inmates in work programs also increased.
On the other hand, the quality of some important inmate services worsened. All but two correctional alternative programs were shut down, and guidance and counseling sessions for inmates were eliminated. While the share of inmates receiving drug treatment and participating in educational programs improved, neither came close to meeting the needs of a mostly drug addicted and poorly educated population.
The DOC also did not improve its poor track record of delivering inmates to court on time. More than one-quarter of the inmates transported to court arrived late throughout the period. As a result, hearings were missed, the number of trips to court increased, and the time spent in jail lengthened; thus, this is not solely an issue of quality, but also of efficiency.
Other aspects of quality are uncertain. Changes in rates of recidivism cannot be determined because the DOC did not report such a measure until 1996, and because the usefulness of the new measure is dubious. Changes in the method of reporting the share of inmates passing the high school equivalency exam render the indicator uninterpretable. The number of visits per inmate may have increased, though the data may not be comparable.
Conclusions
The Citizens Budget Commission believes it is vitally important for all government agencies to seek continually to improve their performance by both lowering costs and increasing the quality of services. Such a process would encompass systematic management review of how services are provided currently, as well as thorough consideration of alternative methods of service delivery. This is especially important in times of fiscal stress such as the City of New York has experienced thus far in the 1990s.
The DOC’s mixed performance during the 1990s does not bode well for the future. For three reasons the DOC is likely to become less efficient. First, debt service continues to be a significant financial burden. Second, labor costs will grow over the next three years as a result of labor contracts and the addition of 1,100 correction officers since April 1996. Third, the closing of programs to divert certain offenders from detention and incarceration will reduce the DOC’s options for lowering the cost of custody and for rehabilitating inmates until its revamped alternatives to incarceration program is underway.
The DOC has proved adept at identifying and implementing productivity improvements and at introducing new technology. It should continue to do so. Particular attention should be paid to transportation costs—improving the DOC’s on-time record will help, but initiatives that obviate transportation needs entirely (such as video teleconferencing and conducting hearings at Rikers Island) would be more efficacious. Expanding upon and replicating the initial successes of Brooklyn’s speedy adjudication program in the other boroughs would cut costs.
Another concern is the declining quality of inmate services. A balance should be sought between better services to inmates and continued fiscal restraint. The elimination of inmate counseling sacrificed service quality in favor of lower costs. Nevertheless, higher quality services need not come at the expense of efficiency. The DOC’s greatest immediate challenge is to find effective and efficient means for addressing the myriad health, educational and social needs of the inmates.
INTRODUCTION
The New York City Department of Correction (DOC) operated 17 jails in fiscal year 1996, with a total capacity of 21,308 beds, three hospital prison wards, a minimum-security hospital unit for terminal-care inmates, and 17 court detention facilities or holding pens.1 (An additional jail, with a capacity of 1,353, stood ready as reserve space for population increases.) Twelve of the jails in use are at the DOC’s central location, Rikers Island; the remaining facilities are distributed among the boroughs, with the exception of Staten Island. Each day these facilities were home to over 18,000 persons who either had committed a crime and been sentenced to one year or less or who were suspected of committing a crime and were awaiting trial, and were thus the DOC’s responsibility to hold, control and care for.2
A full understanding of the immensity of the DOC requires a point of comparison. The DOC’s operating budget is larger than the total correction spending of all but three states (California, New York and Texas), and its jails house more inmates than all local jails combined in each of 44 states3. The DOC’s Transportation Division transports 2.5 million riders a year, roughly the equivalent of the public bus systems of Knoxville, Tennessee, Little Rock, Arkansas or Durham-Chapel Hill, North Carolina.4 This includes transporting inmates to and from court and hospitals and among jails and detention facilities, and staff and visitors among facilities.
This remarkable level of activity occurs in an environment largely beyond the control of the DOC. The flow of inmates into and out of the City’s jail system is determined by the policies and actions of other agencies: The number of persons arrested by the police, and the types of crimes for which they are arrested; the speed with which judges and court administrators, probation officers, the five county district attorneys and the special narcotics prosecutor, public defenders and private defense attorneys proceed with trials and pre-trial hearings; the severity of punishments legislated by the New York City Council and the New York State Legislature. Furthermore, once inmates arrive at the DOC’s doorstep, the manner in which the DOC pursues its mission is closely regulated by court orders and monitored by a trio of public agencies—the New York State Commission of Correction, the New York City Board of Correction and the Office of Compliance Consultants. The intense scrutiny of the DOC is the legacy of many years of poor jail conditions and maltreatment of prisoners.5
This difficult operating environment complicates the task of working with an already challenging clientele. Nearly two-thirds of the jails population is comprised of persons known as "detainees," who have been arrested, but not yet convicted, and are awaiting trial. Interestingly, just 17 percent of the inmate population is convicted criminals serving sentences of one year or less for misdemeanor or felony offenses. An equivalent number of inmates are actually wards of the State who are in the City system for one of three general reasons: They have been convicted and sentenced to more than one year and are awaiting transfer to a State prison; they allegedly have violated parole and are awaiting revocation hearings; or, they are State prisoners with court appearances in the city.
This mostly male (90 percent), mostly minority (91 percent African American or Hispanic6) population is highly problematic and in need of services. Compared to the general population of the city, inmates are less healthy physically and mentally. One out of eight male inmates and more than one of four female inmates is HIV-positive, and one of eight inmates is diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease like syphilis or gonorrhea7. Nearly 14 percent of inmates are asthmatic and 4 percent are diabetic. Inmates are much more likely to have tuberculosis and other communicable diseases, posing serious problems not just for other inmates and DOC employees, but for the populace as a whole—one out of six New Yorkers diagnosed with tuberculosis is a former or current City jail inmate. One in four inmates suffers from psychiatric disorders ranging from adjustment problems to psychoses; one out of 10 is diagnosed with serious and persistent mental illness.
The prevalence of physical and mental health problems among inmates is due in part to the conditions in which they lived prior to entering the system. About 30 percent report having been homeless within three months prior to incarceration, and 50 percent of inmates in the DOC’s mental health units report having been homeless. These health problems are also the result of extraordinarily high rates of drug and alcohol abuse. It is estimated that between 75 and 95 percent of City jail inmates have a history of substance abuse. Federal statistics consistently reveal that 5 out of 6 arrestees in Manhattan test positive for some type of illicit drug.8
Education levels among City inmates are extremely low—only 10 percent have a high school or equivalency diploma, and between 50 and 70 percent of the adult inmates read below a sixth grade level in English9. City inmates are also relatively poor, as demonstrated by the fact that, among inmates for whom bail is set but who cannot afford to post bail, more than one-quarter face bails of $500 or less; almost three out of five have bails of $2,000 or less. On average, however, inmates spend just a month-and-a-half in the jail system, a relatively short window of opportunity for offering rehabilitative or supportive services.
Differences among the inmates also add to the complexity of the DOC’s tasks. While more than half the inmate population is over 30 years old, one-fifth are between 25 and 29 years old, and over one-quarter are between 16 and 24;10 the needs of the youngest and oldest groups are in some ways substantially different. The crimes with which inmates have been charged also vary widely. The highest charge at admission for close to one-third of inmates is a felony offense related to the sale or possession of illicit drugs.11 Another one out of eight is admitted for robbery, one out of 12 for murder or attempted murder, and one out of 20 for burglary. Overall, 70 percent of admissions are for felony offenses. The remaining 30 percent are for misdemeanor offenses, such as larceny (3.0 percent), drugs (2.7 percent) and prostitution (0.1 percent).
Trends in Resources
Given these facts, it is not surprising that running the City’s jails is an expensive enterprise. In fiscal year 1996,12 the DOC spent $1,168 million, 17 percent more than in fiscal year 1990.13 (See Table 1.) Adjusted for inflation, however, operating spending declined 5 percent in fiscal years 1990-1996.
This trend contrasted starkly with the experience during the previous decade, when constant-dollar operating spending rose 204 percent from fiscal year 1980 to fiscal year 1990.14 The rise in spending during the 1980s resulted from two factors—a rapidly growing inmate population and a series of court decrees requiring improvements in inmate living conditions under the threat of court-ordered prisoner releases. The rate of spending growth slowed during the 1990s in part because of a turnaround in the size of the jail population (to be discussed further below). The constant-dollar reduction in spending would have been much greater were it not for tremendous growth in debt service, the cost of repaying bonds issued to finance the construction of jails in response to the court orders and population growth.
The vast majority of the DOC’s operating expenditures—74 percent—was devoted to compensating its employees, in particular its uniformed correction officers.15 In fiscal year 1996, the DOC employed 10,702 correction officers (COs) monthly on average, or about 3 percent more than in fiscal year 1990. However, headcount declined almost steadily after fiscal year 1992, when it peaked at 11,900; between 1992 and 1996, the number of COs fell 10 percent because of a hiring freeze. The graduation in April 1996 of 383 probationary COs from the Correction Academy marked the first new class in five years. Between April 1996 and March 1997, though, the Academy graduated 1,140 new COs.16
The number of civilian employees declined more rapidly, nearly 26 percent from a high of 2,113 in fiscal year 1993 to 1,567 in fiscal year 1996. (Overall, civilian headcount was reduced 22 percent in fiscal years 1990-1996.) Unlike COs, civilian DOC employees were eligible to participate in the City’s severance program in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. A substantial share of lost civilian positions came from the elimination of the Work Release Program and guidance and counseling services to inmates, and a reduction in the number of inmates receiving drug treatment services from the DOC’s Substance Abuse Intervention Division. (These changes are discussed more fully below.)
In addition to operating spending, the DOC also invests annually in the construction and rehabilitation of its jails. During fiscal years 1990-1996, the DOC’s capital expenditures totaled over $1 billion, or almost $150 million annually on average. Annual spending, however, declined in recent years. Adjusted for inflation, the DOC spent one-tenth the amount on capital investments in fiscal year 1996 that it did in fiscal year 1990—$33 million versus $318 million, respectively. Again, this reversed the trend during the 1980s. In 1980 the City spent $3 million on jail construction; by 1990 spending was 50 times higher in constant dollars. The waning jails population contributed to this change, allowing the department to forego previously planned construction of new jail beds.
The remainder of this report examines the services that the Department of Correction produced with these substantial public outlays. The next section considers the performance of the DOC during the 1990s along three dimensions—the volume of work performed by the department, the efficiency of its operations, and the quality of the services it provided.
DEPARTMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN THE 1990s
The operations of municipal agencies can be analyzed with three general classes of measures. Volume indicators measure the quantity, level or mix of services provided; in the DOC, such measures include inmates admitted and average daily population. Efficiency indicators measure how productively resources are utilized to provide services by examining the cost of work performed per unit, such as annual operating cost per inmate. Quality indicators show how well a service achieves its purpose; given the DOC’s responsibility for incarcerating inmates, the annual number of escapes is a useful indicator of the department’s ability to confine inmates within the jails. Each of the next three sections is devoted to one of these categories of performance measures.
Volume
The number of inmates admitted to City jails in fiscal year 1996 was nearly the same as in fiscal year 1990—127,683 versus 125,720, respectively, an increase of less than 2 percent. (Refer to Table 1.) During the seven-year period, however, there were two different trends. The beginning of the 1990s marked a reversal of a decade-long trend of increasing inmate admissions. From 1980 to 1990, annual admissions more than doubled from about 60,500.17 But admissions declined after 1990, falling 15 percent through fiscal year 1993 to under 107,000. This shift was primarily the result of changing arrest behavior by the New York Police Department (NYPD). In particular, less emphasis was placed on low-level narcotics crimes than during the previous decade; drug arrests fell by one-third between fiscal years 1990 and 1993, and total felony arrests by 20 percent.18
The downward trend reversed beginning in fiscal year 1994, such that by fiscal year 1996 admissions had risen more than 19 percent from their fiscal year 1993 low point. A change in arrest policies by the NYPD was the determining factor. Narcotics arrests skyrocketed, increasing 81 percent between fiscal years 1993 and 1996.19 Misdemeanor arrests also rose rapidly, fueled in part by the NYPD’s "quality of life" initiatives. Simultaneously, the percentage of misdemeanor arrestees receiving desk appearance tickets (DATs)20 declined, meaning a greater share were summary arrested and arraigned. This in turn increased the number of misdemeanor arrestees who did not receive bail or could not afford bail and thus were remanded to the custody of the DOC. Additionally, the NYPD has been more thorough in checking for outstanding warrants, resulting in more summary arrests where previously a misdemeanor arrestee might have received a DAT.
Because the number of inmates admitted to the jails varied during the 1990s, the average daily number of inmates in the jails also fluctuated. After nearly tripling from 6,750 in fiscal year 1979 to 19,643 in fiscal year 1990, average daily population continued to rise through fiscal year 1992 to reach an all-time high of 21,449. The inmate population then declined during the next two fiscal years, shrinking almost 16 percent to 18,090. With the increase in arrests, the population again began to rise in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, increasing 4 percent to 18,896 in 1995 before dropping slightly to 18,326 in 1996. During fiscal years 1990-1996 average daily population declined almost 7 percent overall.
The trends in average daily population and annual admissions do not coincide perfectly because the average number of inmates in jail each day is a product not only of how many inmates enter the jail system, but also of how long they remain in jail. (See Figure 1.) The jails population did not initially decline with admissions because average length of stay (ALOS) increased almost one-fourth from 57 days to 71 days between fiscal years 1990 and 1992. Subsequently, ALOS declined steadily through fiscal year 1996, reaching 53 days, 25 percent below its peak. Since 1990, ALOS has declined 7 percent overall.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the causes of the decline in length of stay given the available data, three likely reasons can be identified. Some of the initial decline derived from improvements in transferring sentenced felons to the State prison system in a timely fashion. This came about through the combination of agreements with the State, a court ruling ordering the State to remove the backlog of State prisoners awaiting transfer, and the implementation of an automated tracking system for State-ready inmates. In April 1992 the backlog reached 2,040; within six months it was reduced to 913.21 Overall for fiscal year 1992 the average backlog was 1,642; as of fiscal year 1996 it was 509, fully 69 percent lower.
More recent declines in ALOS for sentenced inmates were due in part to the increase in misdemeanor arrests, including quality of life infractions such as public intoxication, prostitution and illegal peddling. The share of admissions charged with a non-felony offense increased from 30 percent in 1994 to 37 percent in 1996. This shift contributed to shorter ALOS because admissions related to many misdemeanor infractions—particularly quality of life offenses—result in very little time spent in jail, normally no more than a few days before being released with time served. Thus, although such admissions rose greatly, the short time in jail related to these admissions drove down the overall average length of stay. Indeed, while ALOS for felony cases was 15 percent shorter in 1996 than in 1992, for misdemeanor cases it was 36 percent shorter.22 (See Figure 1)
Finally, strides were made in reducing ALOS for detainees by speeding adjudication. The Brooklyn District Attorney’s office began a pilot program in 1992 to shorten the time it took to adjudicate cases. This experiment involved, among other initiatives, reducing the time between indictment and arraignment, limiting adjournments, waiving formal discovery procedures, and computerizing trial scheduling and information transfers with the NYPD.23 The program appears to have been successful. Between 1992 and 1995, average time to disposition in the court parts participating in the pilot decreased 104 days or 42 percent from 249 to 145 days.24 This was partly due to a 47 percent reduction in adjournments until disposition. These strides were made without a significant change in the distribution of dispositions; in other words, the gains did not come via a reduction in the seriousness of the crimes for which suspects were charged and convicted.
The DOC benefited from these initiatives. The ALOS for detainees arrested in Brooklyn declined from 127 days in 1992 to 92 days in 1995, or 27 percent.25 Although a precise connection cannot be made between the shorter disposition times and the briefer lengths of stay, the pilot project was likely a contributor. More recently, though, ALOS for Brooklyn detainees began to inch upward, increasing by almost 5 days in 1996, perhaps because of an NYPD drug initiative in Brooklyn.
The mix of inmates in City jails also changed during the 1990s. Detainees (inmates awaiting trial) consistently accounted for close to two-thirds of the inmate population during fiscal years 1990-1996. However, convicted and sentenced inmates declined 29 percent from 4,457 to 3,184, and their share of total population shrank from 23 percent to 17 percent. By contrast, the number of State inmates rose 35 percent between 1990 and 1996, from 2,335 to 3,147, thereby growing in significance from 12 percent of the population to 17 percent. This growth occurred despite the large reduction since 1992 in the backlog of prisoners waiting to be transferred to the State. After peaking in 1992, the average daily population declined 14 percent, but the total State inmate population shrank 23 percent.
Inmates held on behalf of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service never represented a significant part of the jails population, and their number declined. At their peak, INS inmates totaled 83 in 1992; by fiscal year 1996, there were only 16 INS inmates in City jails on average.
One last interesting shift in the jails population is the greater number of female inmates. As the male population declined along with the overall inmate population (8 percent from 17,932 in fiscal year 1990 to 16,531 in fiscal year 1996), the number of female inmates rose 5 percent from 1,711 to 1,795.
As the population changed during the 1990s, the mix of services provided to it by the DOC changed as well. (See Table 2.) Substantially more inmates participated in educational programs in fiscal year 1996 than in 1990—1,562 on average versus 934, an increase of 67 percent. This level of participation remained relatively stable after 1992. By contrast, 42 percent fewer inmates took the exam to receive a General Equivalency Diploma (GED) in 1996 than in 1990. The DOC explains the decline as the product of the changing needs of the inmate population: Due to an increase in inmates with learning disabilities and special needs, fewer inmates were able to pass a preparatory examination necessary to take the GED.26 However, despite the elimination of the preliminary exam in fiscal year 1994,27 the number of inmates taking the GED remained low, perhaps because of restrictions placed on the availability of exams by the State Department of Education.28
The share of inmates taking the GED who pass appears to have improved since 1990 from 41 percent to 66 percent.29 The percentage reached as high as 77 percent in fiscal year 1993, which the DOC attributed to inmates staying in GED preparation classes longer on average.30 However, all is not as it would appear. The passing rate the DOC reported for 1992 was 57 percent; however, this rate included only those inmates who finished the GED exam. When the non-finishers (who obviously did not pass) are included, the passing ratio falls to 29 percent.31 Because the DOC did not report the number of inmates not finishing the GED in later years, valid passing rates for fiscal years 1993-1996 cannot be determined. If the rate of non-finishing was the same in 1996 as in 1992, the passing rate would be 28 percent instead of 66 percent, roughly the same as for 1992.
Sentenced inmates are required to work in correction industries or participate in work programs, and detainees may participate voluntarily. The number of inmates in work programs and correction industries rose 20 percent between 1990 and 1992, from 5,788 to 6,963 daily. Data after 1992 are incomplete because the DOC ceased to report publicly information on work programs and correction industries. However, using data recently supplied by the DOC, it appears that the average daily population in work programs increased 21 percent from 5,554 in 1990 to 6,740 in 1996.
Fewer health visits took place in 1996 than in 1992 (consistent data for mental health visits are not available for prior years). The overall decline of 2 percent (from 769,000 visits in 1992 to 752,000 in 1996) was driven by a 6 percent reduction in medical visits (dental visits, which represented only about 1 percent of total visits, declined 30 percent). Mental health visits increased 14 percent during the period.
The number of inmates (24,009) receiving some form of treatment for substance abuse in fiscal year 1996 was 33 percent greater than in 1990. This figure was comprised of 16,577 inmates admitted to methadone detoxification and 7,432 inmates treated in the DOC’s Substance Abuse Intervention Division (SAID).32 The SAID programs are drug-free interventions relying on intensive counseling; methadone detoxification is a less expensive approach of daily doses of methadone with little or no counseling.
The distribution between treatment modes in fiscal year 1996 was markedly different than just two years before, when inmates in SAID programs totaled almost 53 percent of all inmates receiving drug treatment. SAID inmates declined in number by two-fifths in the last two years, while the number in methadone detoxification increased 47 percent. This shift was due in part to the shifting needs of the inmate population; specifically, heroin use has been on the rise in recent years, and methadone treatment is specifically geared toward heroin addiction. However, most inmates are not heroin users; crack cocaine addiction remains the most prevalent problem. Most of the decline, therefore, seems to be the product of the elimination of SAID guidance and counseling staff and a policy shift toward less expensive services for inmates.
Guidance and counseling services are provided to inmates to help them cope with a variety of personal problems; these services are potentially very useful in preventing violent incidents and in preparing inmates for life after discharge. The number of guidance and counseling sessions for inmates declined steadily from over 161,000 in 1990 to about 34,000 in 1995, before being eliminated completely in fiscal year 1996.33 (See Figure 2.) At present, there is just one counselor per facility to handle crises.
Alternatives to incarceration (ATIs) are programs intended to improve the effectiveness of rehabilitation for non-violent inmates and to relieve overcrowding. The oldest of the DOC’s correctional alternatives, the Work Release Program, was discontinued in fiscal year 1995. Initiated in the late 1960s, work release allowed inmates to work in a job outside of the prison system during the day, while spending the night in jail. In July 1994, work release was consolidated with the Individualized Monitoring System (IMS) to form the Community Correction Program, which subsequently was closed on December 9, 1994. The cost of the program, its potential for safety problems (from participants who leave for work and do not return to prison), and questions about its effectiveness all contributed to work release’s demise. However, it appears that by shutting down the program, the DOC is violating a State law that requires the City to operate a work release program.34
Two other alternatives to incarceration created during the 1990s are the High Impact Incarceration Program (HIIP) and the Self-Taught Empowerment and Pride Program (STEP). Established in 1991, HIIP is alternatively known as "boot camp" because of its rigid, military-like emphasis on discipline and physical training. HIIP inmates receive counseling and education services, and are expected to perform hard work and community service. Successful completion of HIIP holds the promise of (though it does not guarantee) early release from jail. Compared to its first year of operation, HIIP enrolled 7 percent more inmates in fiscal year 1996. The 549 HIIP participants represented a decline of 47 percent from two years prior. The program was shut down after November 1994 because State funding was lost, and a revised version opened in March 1995.35 The newer, City-funded HIIP includes vocational training, some after-care services, and victim awareness training.
STEP provides female inmates academic and vocational training, drug treatment and independent living skills in an intensive program. Like HIIP, STEP holds the promise of early release. Because the female population is much less numerous than the male population, STEP began on a smaller scale, but it has grown much quicker—58 percent from 307 inmates in its first year to 485 in 1996. Though smaller, STEP reaches a much larger share of the female population than HIIP does the male population. STEP also graduates a greater proportion of its participants—68 percent in fiscal year 1996, and as high as 90 percent the year before.
Recently, the City sought to revamp its correctional alternatives system. In September 1996 the City issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) seeking a single agency to screen all sentenced inmates centrally, and to perform all related court advocacy and monitoring activities. The contract was awarded to the New York City Criminal Justice Agency (CJA). The CJA is the not-for-profit organization employed by the City to interview arrestees and report to the court on their suitability to be released on their own recognizance. A second RFP issued in December sought agencies to provide ATI programs to 6,200 inmates.
Alternatives to detention (ATDs) are valuable both because they reduce the cost of incarcerating detainees and because they tend to reduce sentenced time. Persons who spend the pre-trial period in the community typically receive shorter sentences than persons detained in jail.37 During the 1990-1996 period, the DOC employed several alternatives to detention at one time or another. Bail expediting assists detainees in making bail by obtaining the names of potential sureties and apprising them of bail information and upcoming court dates. Originally begun by the DOC in June 1988, bail expediting served 2,551 detainees in fiscal year 1990 before being shut down.38 The program subsequently was resurrected in Queens and the Bronx by the CJA.
Under the bail re-evaluation program, initiated in fiscal year 1991, the DOC applied to judges for a re-examination of a detainee’s bail; in return, the DOC attempted to place the detainee in a community-based program. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, the DOC advocated for 319 detainees, of whom 183 or 57 percent were released.39 The program subsequently was combined with the IMS, under which released detainees wore a bracelet or anklet that transmits a signal, allowing their whereabouts to be monitored. As mentioned above, the IMS was merged with work release and both were discontinued in fiscal year 1995. Bail re-evaluation never lived up to the DOC’s original intention of serving 800 inmates a year. The DOC also attempted a pilot program in supervised detention in fiscal year 1991. Supervised detention entailed releasing inmates into educational or drug treatment programs under the supervision of the DOC. The program failed to meet expectations, and lasted only four months. Another program, "work for bail," in which inmates with very low bail are allowed to work to pay off their bail, was planned but never started.
One of the principal activities of the DOC’s Transportation Division is busing inmates to and from court appearances. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1996, the number of times inmates were delivered to court grew 7 percent from 432,000 to 462,000. Approximately 25,400 parole violators and inmates sentenced to more than one year were delivered to State prisons, about 4 percent more than in fiscal year 1990. During the course of fiscal year 1996, the department made 7,500 runs to its hospital wards, Rikers Island clinics and other hospitals in the city, transporting 12,000 inmates40. The number of runs in 1996 was 28 percent lower than the 1991 level of about 10,400. Another 500 inmates a year are taken to and from significant family events, such as funerals and marriages41; the DOC also moves inmates and staff among DOC facilities, and visitors from the Rikers Visitor Center to the jail facilities on the island.
Efficiency
The primary measure of the department’s efficiency is the annual operating cost per inmate. This figure rose 25 percent from $50,976 in 1990 to $63,725 in 1996. (See Table 3.) Adjusted for inflation, however, the increase was a more modest 2 percent. While total expenditures were nearly equal in 1990 and 1996, the intervening years were volatile. From 1990 to 1992, constant-dollar spending per inmate fell 8 percent, then rose 17 percent through 1994, before declining again through 1996 by 5 percent.
Two components of spending combined to keep spending up. As mentioned above, debt service on long-term bonds for jail construction increased 130 percent in inflation-adjusted terms between 1990 and 1996. Spending on employee fringe benefits increased by one-fifth in constant dollars. By contrast, City pension contributions for DOC employees were cut in half because of the strong performance of the pension system’s investments. Not including debt service, the constant-dollar cost per inmate declined 9 percent between 1990 and 1996.
The DOC cut overtime spending 46 percent in constant dollars during the period. Overtime spending is a function both of management decisions and of the behavior of employees. Cutting overtime is a perennial concern of the DOC, to which it has taken numerous approaches. These approaches include: Tighter controls on the authorization of overtime; eliminating some posts traditionally staffed by employees working on overtime; increased training and accountability for DOC managers; reviews of sick leave utilization; surprise home visits; examinations by DOC physicians; and, more vigorous investigating and punishing of sick leave abuse. It should be noted, however, that the bulk of the overtime reduction took place between 1990 and 1991, when constant-dollar overtime spending was reduced 47 percent; in other words, adjusted for inflation, overtime spending was no lower in 1996 than in 1991. Despite the initial cuts in overtime, it is still expensive, consuming 10 percent of the DOC agency budget. By comparison, less than 5 percent of the NYPD’s budget goes to overtime.42
A key reason why overtime spending remained high is the extremely high paid absence rate for COs. The absence rate rose one-third during the 1990-1995 period, from 6.6 percent to 8.7 percent, before falling to 7.6 percent in 1996; despite the recent decline, COs averaged 19 paid absences during fiscal year 1996.43 By comparison, the absence rate for all City agencies during that period never rose above 4.1 percent, and the Citywide average number of absences was under 10. Although closer to the citywide average, DOC civilian employees also were absent at increasing rates—the 4.7 percent absence rate in 1996 was 21 percent higher than in 1990.
In addition to lower overtime and pension spending, cost reductions in recent years derived from the elimination of over 500 civilian positions, many of them related to discontinued inmate services such as counseling sessions. The DOC also enacted three significant restructuring actions. First, 211 "C post" officers (a third CO assigned to an inmate housing area) were reassigned during fiscal years 1995 and 1996; the City estimated the annual savings from this initiative to be $11.4 million in fiscal year 1997.44 Second, fire safety improvements allowed the elimination of 149 firewatch posts at a savings of $6.4 million annually.45 Third, a study of uniformed posts begun in 1994 resulted in a reduction of 512 posts.46 Based on the City’s estimated savings for the other two initiatives, the value of the post study changes were about $25 million a year.
Workload measures are another useful kind of efficiency indicator; in the case of the DOC, they take the form of employees per inmate. The total number of employees per 1,000 inmates increased 15 percent (or almost 100 employees) between 1990 and 1994; since then, the ratio declined 8 percent (or almost 60 employees). During the 1990s, the number of employees per inmate rose 6 percent overall, driven by a 10 percent increase in COs per 1,000 inmates (from 529 to 584), which overcame an almost 17 percent reduction in the civilian employees ratio (from 103 to 86).
The DOC believes a better indicator of efficiency combines employment and the effective employment impact of overtime spending with a measure of bed capacity rather than comparing employment to average daily population.47 The resulting statistic, full-time equivalent employees (the "operating level") to capacity, was 1.52 in 1991 (the earliest year for which data was available). By 1995 the figure had risen to 1.64, an 8 percent decline in efficiency; in 1996 it dropped to 1.57, but as of the third quarter of 1997 it had increased to 1.61. Overall between 1991 and 1997, therefore, as measured by the DOC itself efficiency declined 6 percent.
The number of correction officers per supervisor is a measure of the efficiency of the hierarchical structure of the department; the higher the number (meaning, the more COs under each uniformed supervisory employee), the more efficient the department. This figure increased from 8.6 in 1990 to 9.2 in 1996, an improvement of over 7 percent.
Finally, in light of the DOC’s efforts to alleviate difficulties related to transferring State-ready inmates in a timely manner, the backlog of such inmates should be considered. Since the peak (1992), when on average the jails held 1,642 State inmates overdue for transfer, the figure declined more than two-thirds to 507 inmates in 1996. The decline might have been steeper were it not for growth in the number of State parole violators.
Quality
The ideal measure of the quality of a jail system is its ability to reduce an inmate’s likelihood to commit a crime after release. Such a measure—the recidivism rate—could determine if the quality of the DOC’s rehabilitative efforts was improving or declining. Unfortunately, the DOC did not report any type of recidivism rate until fiscal year 1996. The shortcomings of the DOC’s measure further complicate any analysis. It represents the share of current sentenced inmates who have served time in City jails previously (and was 69 percent in fiscal year 1996); the principal shortcoming of this measure is that it does not include inmates who commit crimes and are arrested elsewhere, or who commit crimes and are not arrested at all. A measure defined in this way is merely a count of the inmates with prior City criminal records, and not an indicator of the effectiveness of rehabilitation. A better instrument (though more difficult to design and implement, and thus more expensive) would count the share of former City inmates who commit a crime again, regardless of whether or not they return to the custody of the DOC.
Prominent among other issues of quality is the DOC’s ability to keep the public safe from the inmates in its jails and to keep the inmates safe from one another and from themselves. Several indicators are available to judge the department’s performance in this regard.
The safety of the public is threatened when inmates escape. This occurs very infrequently—on average about four or five times a year. During fiscal years 1990-1996, there were as few as one escape (in 1995) and as many as seven (in 1994). (See Table 4.) Escapees usually are re-apprehended quickly, and often by DOC personnel.
A more frequent occurrence was inmates absconding from the work release program. Between 1990 and 1994 (the last full year work release was in operation), an average of 23 work release participants absconded annually. As a proportion of the inmates admitted to work release each year, the numbers are even more disconcerting: On average, about 5 percent of inmates admitted to work release absconded. And, while absconders were usually eventually recaptured, they were not returned to custody as quickly as escapees.
Suicides among inmates also are infrequent. On average, about three inmates commit suicide each year. More troublesome than keeping inmates safe from themselves is keeping them safe from one another. At times during the 1990s the City’s jails were hotbeds of violence. Overall during the period, though, the rate of violence in the jails fell—the annual number of violent incidents per 100 inmates declined 42 percent between fiscal years 1990 and 1996, from 19.4 to 11.2.48
The most significant declines were in occurrences of inmate-on-inmate violence, which were reduced 70 percent from 8.5 per 100 inmates in 1990 to 2.3 in 1996.49 The only interruption in the steady decline was an upsurge in fiscal year 1995. A concerted effort following this increase resulted in a 59 percent reduction in slashings and stabbings in fiscal year 1996. However, violence began to surge late in fiscal year 1996, attributed mostly to problems following a change in the location of and an increase in the number of inmates being housed in the DOC’s Central Punitive Segregation Unit (CPSU). The CPSU is the maximum security facility on Rikers Island where inmates are punished for up to 90 days for major infractions committed while in jail. There were 32 slashings and stabbings in the CPSU during the last four months of fiscal year 1996, a 39 percent increase over the same period the year before.50
The DOC’s success in reducing violence is the result of efforts throughout the decade. Improved information systems enabled the DOC to better its tracking of inmates with histories of violent altercations. Better training of COs resulted in more judicious uses of force and earlier identification of potential problems among inmates. Efforts were made to identify and separate gang members, and gang-related attire was banned. In addition, the DOC claims to have stepped up searches of jail cells and confiscations of weapons and contraband.51
Declines in use of force by corrections officers, though substantial, have not been as dramatic as the decrease in violence among inmates. The rate of using force among correction officers declined 27 percent during the 1990s, from 20.3 to 14.8 per 100 COs. And the most serious uses of force (Class A)—those that result in "an injury which substantially impairs an officer’s or inmate’s physical condition" or involve the use of a weapon (such as a gun, baton or flashlight) by the CO—were reduced the most (35 percent during the 1990-1996 period). However, the increase in violence in the CPSU late in 1996 resulted in a dramatic increase in uses of force. While slashings and stabbings were two-fifths higher, reported uses of force increased by over 400 percent from 28 to 142.52
Two other types of indicators reflect on living conditions in City jails—measures of crowding and health. Because the growth of the inmate population outstripped the DOC’s capacity to build new jails, the system usually was over capacity during the 1980s. In 1990 the population was 3 percent above capacity on average. As the inmate population fell, the ratio declined to 94 percent in 1993, the lowest level since the 1970s.
The DOC took advantage of the situation by closing some of its temporary housing and by selling its non-traditional facilities (including two upstate jails close to the U.S.-Canada border and two converted barges moored in the East River). Disposing of these facilities improved the quality of conditions in three ways. First, although the temporary modular units provided a ready supply of beds, they offered no ancillary facilities such as dining, recreational and visiting areas. Closing them eased congestion in common areas. Second, the floating jails were comprised largely of cells, with less space for support services than in traditional land-based jails. Third, the distance to the upstate jails (14 hours round-trip by DOC bus) made it difficult for inmates to receive visits from family, friends and attorneys. The ratio of population to capacity subsequently rose due to the resurgent population and fewer beds, but remained below 100 percent, and the DOC had 1,350 beds on reserve if needed to absorb further population growth.
The average annual number of health visits per inmate increased 14 percent during fiscal years 1992-1996. The increase was driven by a 34 percent rise in mental health visits per inmate and a 9 percent increase in medical visits per inmate. No other systematically collected data are publicly available to measure the quality of inmate health services. However, it is apparent that the DOC went to great lengths to address the health needs of the population. Three new medical housing facilities were added to Rikers Island: The West Facility, which includes a 140-bed Communicable Disease Unit for inmates with tuberculosis and other contagious diseases, was opened in the fall of 1991; a special dormitory was opened for inmates with AIDS and AIDS-related health concerns in the North Infirmary Command; and, a 96-cell modular addition was opened in the fall of 1995 for inmates with subacute mental health problems. In addition, a centralized X-ray unit was built at the Anna M. Kross Center.
In addition to indicators of living conditions, the quality of services to inmates can be gauged by the rate at which they participate in rehabilitative activities such as drug treatment and school and work programs. The overall share of inmates receiving some form of drug treatment increased from 14 percent in 1990 to almost 19 percent in 1996. In 1994, the proportion peaked at over 21 percent. While a significant increase, the proportion fell far short of the 85 percent of inmates who test positive for illegal drugs.
The average share of inmates participating in work or school programs rose in the 1990s from 33 percent to 45 percent. The share of inmates in work programs improved from 28 to 37 percent. For education programs alone, the share of inmates participating increased from 4.8 percent to 8.5 percent; despite this increase, the share of inmates reached by school programs was well short of the 90 percent who did not have a high school diploma.
The DOC’s ability to facilitate visits to inmates also reflects on the quality of its services. This was a recurrent problem during the 1980s, because the increase in housing facilities was not matched by the addition of support facilities, like visitor centers. The opening of a new visitor center on Rikers Island in fiscal year 1992 and the easing of crowding should have led to improved performance. During fiscal years 1990-1992, the number of visits per inmate remained steady at about two per month, far below the allowable limit of two per week for sentenced inmates and three per week for detainees. Data beyond 1992 are incomplete; DOC data for the last six months of fiscal year 1996 show the number of visits per inmate was 2.3.53
The performance of the DOC’s Transportation Division can be analyzed using "inmates delivered to court on time." On-time delivery to court is crucial because if an inmate is not present in court at the start of the day when the docket is read, his case is dropped from the docket and rescheduled for a later date. This has the effect of lengthening a detainee’s stay in jail, which increases the department’s costs (thereby reducing efficiency) and reduces the quality of services to inmates. During the 1990s, the DOC never delivered more than 74 percent of inmates to court on time, despite repeated efforts to improve, including the creation of an "Inmate to Court Tracking System." In other words, at least one in four inmates was delivered late to court, and thus was likely to have spent more time in jail awaiting trial than was necessary. Recently, the department began reporting the share of "on-trial" inmates delivered to court promptly, indicating an emphasis on inmates currently involved in trial proceedings. In fiscal year 1996 that figure was 97 percent.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
When the Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) reviewed the performance of the New York City Department of Correction during fiscal years 1987-1989, the DOC received a failing grade.54 The City’s response during the 1980s to the surging inmate population—investing a billion dollars in new jails and tripling the size of the operating budget—was inefficient and ineffective. New jail space was filled as fast as the DOC could build it. Consequently, departmental efficiency declined and services to inmates suffered.
The CBC’s next look at the DOC found a department in turnaround.55 Costs were declining, efficiency improving, violence beginning to abate, and more inmates were in drug treatment and work and school programs. While there was room for further improvement, the performance of the DOC during fiscal years 1989-1992, combined with the start of the population decline, painted an optimistic future for the department.
Table 5 summarizes the findings of the CBC’s review of DOC performance in fiscal years 1990-1996. It presents a mixed record: In some ways the department has built well upon the foundation laid in the early part of the decade; in others, it has taken giant steps backward. While dealing with a smaller inmate population, the DOC improved the quality of living conditions, but reduced the quality of some services to inmates, and failed to improve overall efficiency despite some significant accomplishments.
The DOC’s basic mission is to convert law-breakers into law-abiding citizens. Incarceration serves as punishment, and as a reminder to potential and prior criminals that their freedom is at stake. Rehabilitation makes criminals more productive members of society; the DOC follows several approaches to this goal, including drug treatment, education and training. The ultimate measure of the DOC’s attainment of these goals is the recidivism rate. Unfortunately, the DOC does not report a meaningful measure of recidivism.
Absent this measure, evaluating the DOC’s performance must rely on proxy measures of process. First, the DOC can be proud of its successful efforts to control violence in the jails. Inmate-on-inmate violence is down an astounding 70 percent. Enhanced searches and security measures reduced slashings and stabbings among inmates by 59 percent in the last year alone. There were 35 percent fewer uses of the most injurious force by correction officers. Escapes and suicides were held to their usual low level. This record of achievement was the product of a steady, concerted effort over the entire period. The sole causes for concern are the increase in inmate-on-inmate violence in the CPSU at the end of 1996, and the shocking 400 percent increase in use of force by correction officers that accompanied the increased violence.
Some quality measures, especially those related to living conditions, showed improvement. Overcrowding was eased with the decline in the inmate population. The DOC used the opportunity to dispose of facilities that contributed to the previously low quality of inmate living conditions, including the jail barges, the two jails upstate, and many of the temporary structures. The share of inmates receiving drug treatment increased from one out of seven to one out of five at one point, though there is a vast difference between the 84 percent of inmates who test positive for illegal drugs and the 19 percent who get drug treatment services while in jail. New medical facilities were added to Rikers Island, and the number of health visits per inmate increased 14 percent.
The DOC’s ability to get inmates to court on time remains inefficiently low. Between 26 and 29 percent of inmates were delivered to court late during the period, unnecessarily lengthening their stays in jail. Recently the DOC has begun to report the share of "on-trial" inmates delivered on time, which is a more respectable 97 percent. However, this means that detainees delivered to court for hearings are arriving on time even less often than the overall 71 to 74 percent.
Detainees are the largest part of the inmate population; delivering them to court on time more often would likely result in shorter lengths of stay, which would have a significant positive impact on the size of the average daily population and thus on the DOC’s costs. In 1996 over 129,000 inmates were delivered late and may have been rescheduled for a future appearance. The cost to the DOC for every extra day that those 129,000 inmates stayed in jail was approximately $23 million.56
Shorter detention periods prior to trial and fewer trips to court would greatly improve the quality of services to inmates as well. Traveling to court involves an early wake up, hours waiting in holding pens without knowing how a case is proceeding, and food which is inferior to that received in the jails. Getting inmates to court on time would reduce the frequency of these experiences. The DOC is planning to add more buses and correction officers to address the problem, and will also use new computer programming to stagger the delivery of inmates to the Bronx Supreme Court. Taking other steps like video teleconferencing and moving judges to Rikers to conduct hearings would obviate many trips in the first place, and would be a more efficient solution.
The DOC kept growth in constant-dollar spending per inmate to 2 percent, despite rapid increases in debt service expenditures. The number of COs per supervisor rose, and the agency became less top-heavy. A court order and cooperative efforts between the City and State brought the average daily backlog of State-ready inmates down 69 percent from its 1992 peak, although growth in the number of parole violators remains a concern.
A significant source of the department’s cost reductions, however, was the elimination of one-quarter of the civilian staff in fiscal years 1995 and 1996. Reductions in the civilian corps of uniformed agencies raise the possibility that uniformed employees are performing administrative and other tasks at costs higher than necessary; the DOC has had problems with civilianization in the past.57
Furthermore, questions may be raised about the DOC’s ability to meet the part of its mission related to rehabilitating and caring for inmates. Guidance and counseling sessions for inmates were eliminated. While more inmates are participating in drug treatment, there has been a shift away from the more comprehensive services provided by SAID. There is no evidence that these programs were or were not effective; however, unless the DOC is abdicating its responsibility to care for and rehabilitate inmates, eliminating or drastically cutting these programs represents a substantial decline in quality. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the programs retained, such as HIIP and STEP, have been any more successful.
Looking forward, there are significant challenges to the DOC’s ability to improve or maintain efficiency. Although overtime was down during the period, it remains high, in large part because of rampant absenteeism among COs. While the growth in debt service spending may abate in the coming years, it will remain a significant and increasing cost. The number of employees per inmate increased despite the 25 percent reduction in civilian staff, and these figures do not yet account for the 1,100 new COs added to the force since April 1996. Furthermore, the DOC’s spending figures do not include the cost of a labor agreement with the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (COBA), which has been without a contract for over two years. If the COBA contract follows the pattern set by the Uniformed Firefighters Association, then personal service spending for COs will increase close to 16 percent over the next three years. The DOC has not felt the full impact of the civilian collective bargaining agreement either; the first of three raises that will increase civilian salaries and fringe benefits by 13 percent took effect on April 1 of this year.
In recent years the DOC has shown itself adept at identifying productivity measures to reduce costs. The department has reassigned COs to more productive posts and utilized technology to improve its management of the inmate population. It will need to continue such achievements in order to counteract upward budget pressures; the City’s budget for fiscal year 1998 includes three initiatives that together will save an estimated $61 million.58 A comprehensive review is needed of what the DOC does and how the DOC does it, in light of expected trends, followed by a thorough restructuring. Particular attention should be paid to the costly practices involved in transporting inmates. Programs to speed the adjudication process will be crucial to maintaining the inmate population at a manageable level. Faster disposition also may help to reduce crime. Of those persons rearrested while on bail, about half are re-apprehended within five to six weeks.59 Theoretically, then, the 50 percent of crime committed while on bail after six weeks could be prevented if the time to trial was cut to 35-40 days. The other principal players in the criminal justice system—the police, judges and district attorneys—will have to carry their share of the burden to make this a reality. Getting them to do so will require an overarching plan, administered centrally by the mayor’s Criminal Justice Coordinator.
The vacating in 1996 of a long list of court decrees—covering such varied operational issues as inmate access to newspapers and telephones, personal searches, personal hygiene and eating outside of cells—should produce additional savings ($3.5 million annually, by the City’s estimation60). Care should be taken, however, that such savings do not come from declines in the quality of inmate services or abrogations of prisoner rights.
Further cost reductions and service improvements may be possible through competition. The DOC produced a Request for Expressions of Interest in 1995, seeking to determine what functions private companies and public employees might compete to provide. To date, the DOC has not offered up any services for competition, although there are logical candidates among the department’s support functions, such as food preparation and equipment and vehicle maintenance.
Finally, the DOC’s efforts to keep costs down will not be made easier by its retreat from alternatives to incarceration and detention. If any of the lessons of the 1980s were learned by the DOC, it will remember that ATIs and ATDs were a part of the turnaround in efficiency and quality, and it will not return to the practice of simply locking up as many people as are delivered to its doorstep.61 Programs like the Individualized Monitoring System are proven cost cutters; for instance, Michigan reports its monitoring costs are $6.50 a day, as compared with incarceration costs of up to $60 daily.62 A review of electronic monitoring in California found annual costs ranging from $2,500 to $8,500, depending on the type of system used.63 Using a conservative estimate of $20,000 a year for incarceration, these figures represent savings of 58 to 88 percent. The DOC’s plans for revamping the ATI system may be an effective solution. Reaching the ambitious goal of diverting 6,200 inmates would be a tremendous accomplishment. However, it is likely to be several years before improvements in efficiency and quality derive from this nascent initiative.
Endnotes
1. New York City Department of Correction, "Ten Jails on Rikers Island," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/ jailist1.html>, and "Off-Rikers Jails," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/jailist2.html>. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Preliminary, March 2, 1995, p. 33. Michael P. Jacobson, Commissioner, Department of Correction, "Draft Review of Department Performance," memorandum to Raymond D. Horton, President, Citizens Budget Commission, dated May 22, 1997, p. 1.
2. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume I: Agency Narratives, September 16, 1996, p. 25.
3. Spending data from U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), Table 1.10, p. 12; data are for 1992. Inmate population data from Ibid., Table 6.15, p. 550; data are as of December 31, 1993.
4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, National Transit Database (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), <http://www.fta.dot.gov/fta>.
5. For a concise history of the consent decrees governing the City's jails, see Ross Sandler, "The City seeks to regain control over its jails, and receives help from the federal court and Congress," City Law, Volume 2, Number 3, June/July 1996, pp. 49-54.
6. Correctional Association of New York, "Prisoner Profile," March 1997.
7. Figures in this paragraph and the next are derived from data provided by the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, except where noted.
8. The figure for 1995 was 84 percent, 82 percent for 1994, and 83 percent for 1988. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1995 Drug Use Forecasting: Annual Report on Adult and Juvenile Arestees (Rockville, MD: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, June 1996), p. 29, and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of National Drug Control Policy, "Fact Sheet: Drug Use Trends" (Rockville, MD: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, July 1996), p. 4.
9. Data in this paragraph are from the Correctional Association of New York, op. cit.
10. New York City Department of Correction, "Inmate Population by Age Groups," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/ doc/html/agestats.html>. Data are for February 1996.
11. Data on highest charge at admission from New York City Department of Correction, "Inmates by Top Charge at In-Take," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/rapstats.html>. Data are for February 8, 1996.
12. Except where noted, all years are City fiscal years, which run from July 1 through June 30 and correspond to the year in which they conclude. For example, fiscal year 1996 began on July 1, 1995, and ended on June 30, 1996.
13. This figure includes payments on long-term debt issued to fund the construction of jail facilities, contributions to employee pension funds, and the cost of employee fringe benefits such as health insurance and social security.
14. City of New York, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Comptroller, fiscal years 1980 through 1990 editions.
15. Ibid., fiscal year 1996 edition.
16. New York City Department of Correction, "First New Recruit Class Since '91," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/newcos.html>.
17. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, May 9, 1980, p. 15.
18. Ibid., fiscal years 1990 through 1993 editions.
19. Ibid., fiscal years 1993 through 1996 editions. The data for 1996 may not be comparable due to a merger of the NYPD with the Housing Authority and Transit Authority police departments. City officials have not been available to confirm or deny this.
20. A desk appearance ticket is a written summons issued by the police requiring appearance in court on a future date for arraignment. DATs are restricted by State law to non-felony arrests, and the NYPD further restricts them by denying them to persons with outstanding warrants, persons who are admitted addicts but are not in an authorized treatment program, or persons who are arrested on weapons and certain other charges. All other arrests are summary arrests, which involve transferring arrestees from the precincts to Central Booking, where they are processed (photographed, finger-printed, etcetera) and held for arraignment. New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Semi-Annual Report: Second Half of 1994, undated, p. 37.
21. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, op. cit., Preliminary, February 11, 1993, p. 45.
22. Data in this paragraph provided by the DOC.
23. Kings County District Attorney's Office, "Expedited Case Processing Report," October 1993.
24. Robert N. Kaye, Deputy District Attorney, Kings County, "December 1995 Pilot Part Statistics," memorandum to the Expedited Case Processing Group, April 30, 1996. Figures are for calendar years.
25. New York City Department of Correction figures supplied by the Office of the Kings County District Attorney. Figures are for calendar years.
26. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, op. cit., September 17, 1992, p. 61.
27. Ibid., September 13, 1994, p. 39.
28. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume II: Agency and Citywide Indicators, September 16, 1996, p. 20.
29. These percentages do not refer to the number of inmates taking the GED, but to the inmates for whom results had been received prior to the end of the fiscal year.
30. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, op. cit., September 17, 1993, p. 67. The figure was reported by the DOC as 78 percent; however, according to the DOC, results were received for 383 of the 527 exams administered, of which 296 were passed, producing a passing rate of 77 percent (296 ÷ 383).
31. The DOC does not agree that not finishing should be equated with failure. According to the DOC, "The [GED] exam is administered in five parts over several days. If an inmate does not finish the exam because he is discharged, must appear in court, or for any other reason beyond his control, he may elect to resume testing upon discharge or while in our custody at a later date." However, the DOC was unable to provide data on the share of inmates who do not finish for these reasons or who finish the exam at a later date. Gary M. Lanigan, Deputy Commissioner of Administration, New York City Department of Correction, "Response to Questions Regarding Review of Department of Correction Performance," memorandum to Dean Mead, Citizens Budget Commission, June 6, 1997, p. 1.
32. The methadone data for 1995-1996 are not strictly comparable with earlier years; the data for those two years reflect entry into the detoxification program, whereas the figures for 1990-1994 count referrals to the program. However, the overwhelming majority of referrals result in program participation. For example, in 1995 13,313 inmates entered the program from 14,596 referrals, for a ratio of 91 percent. Applying the same ratio to 1990 produces entries of 12,099 and a 1990-1996 percentage increase in methadone treatment of 37 percent rather than the 25 percent in Table 2.
33. The DOC also made about 55,000 referrals to outside agencies for training, drug rehabilitation and other services to inmates in 1990, and another 53,000 in 1991. After 1991 the DOC ceased to report them. Ibid., September 17, 1991.
34. Correction Law of the State of New York, Article 6-A, "Work Release Program in New York City Correctional Institutions," Section 151.
35. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume II: Agency and Citywide Indicators, September 14, 1995, p. 14.
36. Jacobson, op. cit., p. 4.
37. National Pretrial Reporting Program data cited in Samuel Walker, Sense and Nonsense About Crime and Drugs, third edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994).
38. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, op. cit., September 17, 1990, p. 20.
39. Ibid., September 17, 1992, p.57.
40. Inmate figure from New York City Department of Correction, "An Overview," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/overview.html>.
41. New York City Department of Correction, "Transportation Division," <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doc/html/transprt.html>.
42. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume II: Agency and Citywide Indicators, September 16, 1996.
43. Ibid., p. 222.
44. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume I: Agency Narratives, September 16, 1996, p. 29.
45. Ibid., September 15, 1995, p. 22.
46. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, op. cit., Preliminary, March 2, 1995, p. 37.
47. Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 2 and 10.
48. Due to a change by the DOC in the definitions of uses of force beginning in February 1990, the figure for fiscal year 1990 is extrapolated from data for the last five months of the fiscal year. Consequently, the trends should be interpreted with some caution: If the last five months of fiscal year 1990 were more violent than the previous seven months, then extrapolating overstates the level of violence in that year, and thus overestimates the decline in violence between 1990 and 1996. Using 1991 as a base, however, the level of violence still exhibits a significant decline: The rate of violent incidents per 100 inmates was lowered 29 percent, as opposed to 42 percent between 1990 and 1996. Concerns about the validity of extrapolating the 1990 data are greater for uses of force. During the 1991-1996 period, the decline in uses of force per 100 COs was a relatively unremarkable 6 percent; the reduction using extrapolated 1990 data is a full 21 percentage points higher.
49. The number of incidents measures violent events, rather than the number of inmates involved in violence. The latter figure would be significantly higher; by definition, the number of inmates involved in inmate-on-inmate violence would be at least twice as high as the number of incidents.
50. Data provided by the New York City Board of Correction.
51. The DOC has asserted on a number of occasions that searches increased from 40,000 to 104,000 in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, respectively, and the number of weapons seized increased from 4,900 to 8,000. For instance, see page 2 of Commissioner Michael P. Jacobson's remarks at the New York City Council Public Safety Committee's hearing on violence in the jails, September 4, 1996, and City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume II: Agency and Citywide Indicators, September 16, 1996, p. 18. However, a footnote to the September 1995 edition of The Mayor's Management Report explains that the 1995 data are only for the last five months of the fiscal year. Ibid., September 14, 1995, p. 14. Recalculating the data on a monthly average basis shows a much smaller increase in searches (from 8,034 to 8,683) and a decrease in weapons seized (from 979 to 667). The DOC reports the number of monthly searches increased to 12,869 in the first nine months of 1997; see Jacobson, op. cit., May 22, 1997, p. 3.
52. Data provided by the New York City Board of Correction.
53. Jacobson, op. cit., May 22, 1997, p. 7. It is unclear if this figure is consistent with earlier measures.
54. Raymond D. Horton and Elisabeth Hultcrantz, The State of the Uniformed Services: Recommendations for Improved Performance (NY: Citizens Budget Commission, January 1990), pp. 21-24.
55. Dean Michael Mead, The Performance of the New York City Department of Correction: Recommendations for Improvement (NY: Citizens Budget Commission, January 1993).
56. Calculated as follows: [Inmates delivered to court times (1 - percent delivered on time)] times (annual cost per inmate ÷ 366), or [462,092 x (1-0.72)] x ($63,725 ÷ 366) = $22,527,616.
57. See Office of the State Deputy Comptroller for the City of New York, New York City Department of Correction: Personnel Utilization and Payroll/Time-Keeping Operations, Report No. 85-C-9, February 6, 1987, and Office of the State Deputy Comptroller for the City of New York, New York City Department of Correction: Follow-up on Civilianization, Report No. A-5-91, February 14, 1992.
58. City of New York, Office of Management and Budget, Financial Plan Fiscal Years 1997-2001, Volume 2, January 30, 1997.
59. Bureau of Justice Statistics data cited in Walker, op. cit.
60. City of New York, Mayor's Office of Operations, The Mayor's Management Report, Volume I: Agency Narratives, September 16, 1996, p. 27. The City also received relief in 1995 from a court order to build a $250 million food service facility.
61. On a more mundane level, by not operating a work release program, the DOC appears to be breaking the law.
62. Andre Henderson, "Justice By The Foot," Governing, November 1996, pp. 43-46.
63. Joan Petersilia, "Intensive Supervision Probation for High Risk Offenders: Findings from Three California Experiments" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 1990), as cited in Walker, op. cit.